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The Choice of Economic Systems in the Rawlsian Original Position 
Abstract
Rawls’ consideration not to include the choice of economic systems as part of a theory of 
justice is inconsistent with his comments on redistribution and the political effects of 
economic inequality. When Rawls’ discussion of economic systems, and his discussion of 
economic inequalities are examined, it is apparent that the selection of economic systems is a 
pertinent topic for a theory of justice. The propensity for the primary social good of self-
respect to be satisfied can be affected by the selection of economic systems. Rawls has 
incorrectly determined the selection of economic systems to be unimportant if different 
economic systems can be more advantageous to the satisfaction of self-respect than others. 
When socialism and Rawls’ version of regulated capitalism are compared socialism is a 
maximin solution, and accordingly will be selected by people within the original position 
under the veil of ignorance.
Introduction
In this paper I will argue that Rawls comes close to endorsing socialist control over the means of 
production in A Theory if Justice and that socialist control over the means of production is a 
maximin strategy when compared to private property ownership. The reason why Rawls does not
actually endorse socialist control over the means of production, and consider socialism as a 
maximin strategy, is due to two reasons, first, because he lessens the difference between 
socialism and capitalism by outlining a heavily regulated capitalism as the version of capitalism 
he endorses; and, second, he does not sufficiently address the impact of the capitalist mode of 
production on the achievement of self-respect, perhaps the most important primary good.
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This paper will be structured in three parts. The first part will review Rawls’ comments in A 
Theory of Justice (which I will call Theory for the rest of the article) on different economic 
systems and why he considers the difference between economic systems as inconsequential. This
section will also be an overview of Rawls version of regulated capitalism. The second part will 
be a review of what Rawls considers to be important to people in their social arrangements, 
which is the satisfaction of their self-respect through the achievement, or the assurance of 
attempts at achieving, their long-term goals. In the third section of the paper I will argue that 
socialism is a maximin strategy when compared to Rawlsian regulated capitalism because 
socialism provides people a better chance at achieving self-respect than Rawlsian regulated 
capitalism. 
I: Rawls’ Comments on Economic Systems
Rawls’ perspective, when considering economic systems, is from the standpoint of justice. 
Justice, for Rawls, is what would be selected under the unbiased, and thus fair, conditions of the 
original position, with the veil of ignorance in effect (Rawls, 1999, 10-13). The veil of ignorance 
prevents people form having knowledge about their abilities and social position. This condition 
thus allows them to be unbiased in their selection of social rules, or as Rawls calls them, 
principles of justice. Rawls considers the selection of either capitalism or socialism as follows: 
Which of these systems and the many intermediate forms most fully answers to the requirements of 
justice cannot, I think, be determined in advance. There is presumable no general answer to this 
question, since it depends in large part upon the traditions, institutions, and social forces of each 
country, and its particular historical circumstances. The theory of justice does not include these 
matters. (Rawls, 1999, 242).
2
This seems to be an odd comment since the concept of justice is defined by Rawls as: “The 
concept of justice I take to be defined, then, by the role of its principles in assigning rights and 
duties and in defining the appropriate division of social advantages (Rawls, 1999, 9).” This 
definition would lead one to think that the choice of economic systems would play a large role in
people’s selection processes under the veil of ignorance, since social advantages are shaped by 
the decision making structures of an economic system. Furthermore, the assigning of rights and 
duties are also shaped by how control over resources structures people’s success in exercising 
their rights and fulfilling their duties.1 
Under the veil of ignorance people don’t know what their abilities are but they do know “the 
principles of economic theory (Rawls, 1999, 119).” If this is the case they would know about the 
range of inequalities in capitalist countries and socialist countries. They would know about 
theoretical versions of capitalism and socialism. They would also know the history of the 
economic fates of different countries. With all this knowledge available why would the selection 
of an economic system not be a matter for a theory of justice?
The answer to this question can be found in Rawls’ consideration of the difference between 
capitalism and socialism. Rawls thinks that the key difference between the two economic 
systems is the degree of public ownership of the means of production (Rawls, 1999, 235). Both 
capitalist and socialist systems can use markets for the allocation of jobs and consumption goods 
(Rawls, 1999, 239). But, socialism will use planning by a public body to determine investment 
decisions, whereas this function is relegated to private owners of the means of production within 
capitalism (Rawls, 1999, 239). Rawls also thinks that prices will not be determined by incomes 
under socialism whereas they will be determined by incomes within capitalism (Rawls, 1999, 
241). 
1 Daniels discusses how inequalities of wealth may make equal liberty impossible. See Daniels (n.d.).
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These seem like substantial differences that would greatly affect people’s prospects of “social 
advantages.” Also, Rawls thinks that market failures are possible with the usual problems of free 
riders, externalities, inequality, and the under-funding of public goods (Rawls, 1999, 235-240; 
Rawls, 1996, 266-7). If people who live within a capitalist system would be subject to inequality,
unemployment, underinvestment, and crises, then the selection of socialism would appear to be 
the better choice. 
After Rawls introduces and discusses the differences between socialism and capitalism and 
discusses the problems of market failure he then goes on in the next section of Theory to discuss 
what distributive institutions would be selected by people if capitalism was the economic system 
they, seemingly, know would be the economic system they would exist in. Rawls assumes 
capitalism as the mode to be discussed “since this case is likely to be better known (Rawls, 1999,
242).” 
The economic institutions that people would select to regulate their capitalist economic 
systems are manifold.  The government would “insure equal chances of education and culture 
(Rawls, 1999, 243).” A social minimum of income would be provided for those sick or 
unemployed and minimum incomes would be provided for everyone (Rawls, 1999, 243, 244, and
252).  The state would oversee prices to keep them “workably competitive and to prevent the 
formation of unreasonable market power” and maintain full-employment (Rawls, 1999, 244). 
Also, the state would use taxation “to correct the distribution of wealth and to prevent 
concentration of power detrimental to the fair value of political liberty and fair equality of 
opportunity (Rawls, 1999, 245).” Rawls thus thinks that with these institutions in place “many 
socialist criticisms of the market economy are met” and “the worst aspects of so-called wage 
slavery are removed (Rawls, 1999, 248).” 
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Most importantly for Rawls’ overall appraisal of distribution is the mechanism called the 
difference principle. The difference principle limits types of inequality by permitting, as a 
principle of justice, only inequalities that yield gains for the worst off (Rawls, 1999, 53). Rawls 
thereby thinks that the economic outcomes for all people in society will be linked  (Rawls, 1999, 
70). Inequalities are permitted only if there are to the benefit of all, or at least the worst off, but 
this distributive principle itself does not limit the range of inequality. Accordingly, any 
inequalities that benefit all are permitted by the difference principle (Rawls, 1999, 470). 
Obviously the difference principle alone will not be selected by people in the original position, 
since it would permit extreme disparities in the accumulation of wealth. Without a social 
minimum, a full-employment policy, and redistributive taxation the choice of capitalism is not 
advantageous. 
In review, the reason why Rawls’ thinks the selection of economic systems is not a topic 
for a theory of justice is because the problems of inequality, private property ownership, and 
market failure can be limited by regulation of the economy by the state. But, I think that Rawls 
has not left the selection of economic systems open to “the traditions, institutions, and social 
forces of each country, and its particular historical circumstances (Rawls, 1999, 242).” Rather, 
what Rawls offers as a selection is not between capitalism and socialism, but rather between 
socialism and a very regulated capitalism. In actuality, the selection provided is not for the 
people in the original position; it is a selection by Rawls according to what he finds to be the 
most well-know economic system. Rawls, thus, goes with the current opinion and, apparently, 
the dispositions of his readership. But, the choice between Rawlsian regulated capitalism and 
socialism becomes more pronounced once we consider other aspects of Rawls’ political 
philosophy.
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II: Rawls Comments on Self-Respect and Inequality
When people consider what their social world should be like, when they are in the original 
position, the most important element is the satisfaction of their self-respect. Rawls describes self-
respect as:
First, …it includes a person’s sense of his own value, his secure conviction that his conception of his 
good, his plan of life, is worth carrying out. And second, self-respect implies a confidence in one’s 
ability, so far as it is within one’s power, to fulfill one’s intentions. (Rawls, 1999, 386).
Also, Rawls considers the good of a person’s life, the achievement that produces self-respect, as:
The main idea is that a person’s good is determined by what is for him the most rational long-term 
plan of life given reasonably favorable circumstances. A man is happy when he is more or less 
successfully in the way of carrying out this plan. (Rawls, 1999, 79). 
I think one can accordingly understand the relationship between a person’s good and self-respect 
as follows: 1. The good for humans is a long-term plan of life. 2. People have self-respect when 
their long-term plan of life is achieved or they have good reasons to think their long-term plans 
could be achieved.
What is the relationship between Rawls understanding of people’s goals and the selection of 
economic systems? If people desire self-respect and self-respect is gained when their long-term 
plans are achieved, or its achievement is reasonably assured, then people’s access to resources 
will affect their prospects for self-respect, since all actions are dependent on access to resources. 
Thus, the selection of economic systems is important to people if they are concerned with the 
gaining of self-respect, because the satisfaction of self-respect is dependent on long-term plans 
being realized or assured. This realization or assurance of long-term plans requires access to 
resources whose availability is determined according to the decision making structure of the 
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economic system one finds oneself in. This especially appears to be the case because Rawls 
considers humans, in general, to have a conception of their personal good that requires the 
performance of complex actions or abilities, as opposed to a good which is achieved through 
simple actions or with abilities requiring little development (Rawls, 1999, 373). 
This kind of human good that is satisfied through complex actions is called the Aristotelian 
Principle. Rawls describes it as follows:
… other things equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities (their innate or 
trained abilities), and this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or the greater its 
complexity. (Rawls, 1999, 374).
And, Rawls describes humans’ desires according to the Aristotelian Principle as:
The Aristotelian Principle is a principle of motivation. It accounts for many of our major desires, and 
explains why we prefer to do some things and not others by constantly exerting an influence over the 
flow of our activity. Moreover, it expresses a psychological law governing changes in the pattern of 
our desires. Thus the principle implies that as a person’s capacities increase over time…, and as he 
trains these capacities and learns how to exercise them, he will in due course come to prefer the more 
complex activities that he can now engage in which call upon his newly realized abilities. (Rawls, 
1999, 375).
People desire to satisfy their self-respect through the achievement of complex abilities. Since 
Rawls thinks it is not politically stable to determine the good for individuals, what people pursue 
is up to them within the limits of justice (Rawls, 1999, sections 50 and 68). Knowing the 
psychological motivation of the Aristotelian Principle, but not knowing their own preferences for
complex activities when they are under the veil of ignorance, people would wish to preserve 
access to resources for all people that would not depend on social position or natural ability, 
since this would be to their advantage when they cannot calculate the probabilities of their social 
position. The intention of the original position is to harmonize, within the demands of justice, 
social stability and people’s individuality. Rawls indeed thinks that the aligning of people’s 
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desires with the general good of society can only go so far. But, people can desire a society that 
enables them the best possible circumstances to achieve their own individual plans. People can 
rationally choose the reconciliation of interests (Rawls, 1999, 498). 
This is exactly what Rawls intends with the economic institutions and principles of 
opportunity and distribution listed above. But, as I will argue for in the next section, if the 
achievement of self-respect is a key motivation for people, and they gain self-respect when they 
perform complex actions, can we really say that the selection of an economic system is 
unimportant for a theory of justice when the access to resources will directly affect people’s 
chances to achieve self-respect? 
III: Socialism as a Maximin Strategy 
In review, first, Rawls thinks that the selection between the economic systems of capitalism and 
socialism is not a topic of justice because he reduces the difference between them by presenting a
heavily regulated capitalism as one of the choices. Second, Rawls’ appraisal of what is important
to people and their motivations, self-respect and complex long-term plans, brings into doubt that 
the selection of economic systems is not a topic for a theory of justice. The later point makes it 
apparent that the selection of economic systems is important for a theory of justice and would be 
a topic of choice for people in the original position under the veil of ignorance. I will argue that 
the maximin strategy will be the selection of socialism over capitalism for the following reasons:
1. Greater control over investment.
2. Greater control over the workplace.
3. A social equality that extends beyond equal citizenship.
4. A greater chance at achieving ones complex long-term goals. 
5. A greater chance at obtaining or being assured that one’s self-respect will be satisfied. 
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Socialism will increase the prospects of the worst off in society because control over 
investment decisions would be state policy subject to democratic constraints. This point makes 
all the difference between Rawlsian regulated capitalism and socialism since investment 
decisions can be made to promote ways of life that are beneficial to a few or to greater numbers 
of people. People who have poor skills and weak prospects at developing their skills will not 
gain as much from market transactions where they will be out competed by others. But, most 
importantly they will be at the mercy of development policy that seeks profitability over 
maintaining a modern industrial base that develops products intended to meet needs.2 People, in 
the unbiased situation of the veil of ignorance, realize that pursuing their long-term goals 
requires societal wide coordination. The private provisioning of investment planning has never 
been, nor ever will be, up to the task (Galbraith, 2009, 164-175). The ability for a populace to 
have control over investment decisions will be maximin superior to private control over 
investment. 
Democratic control over the workplace will be superior, or just possible, under a democratic 
socialism. Rawls does not discuss workplace management by the workers themselves, but this 
would be an important means for people to develop complex abilities and to achieve their long-
term goals. If people can strive toward their long-term goals as part of their paid labor then their 
major psychological motivation will have a greater chance at being satisfied under socialism then
under regulated capitalism. Also, if some people’s long-term goals were strictly achievable 
outside of paid employment workplace democracy would provide a sounder basis for the 
provisioning of flexible schedules and reduced work hours, thus enabling a greater chance to 
satisfy one’s self-respect.  
2 On this point see Baran and Sweezy (1966) chapter 5.
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People will have a greater chance at attempting to complete their long-term goals and thereby 
achieving self-respect under socialism because of the above reasons. Since many long-term 
goals, if not all of them, require access to resources socialism will improve people’s access to 
resources by (the nature of a socialized economic system) preventing people from being 
separated from the means of production. If people can never be separated from control over the 
means of production this increases their chances to achieve self-respect. Rawls’ regulated 
capitalism does provided income and employment guarantees. But, guaranteed control over the 
means of production is a superior maximin solution. 
To reiterate, the differences between the economic systems of Rawlsian regulated capitalism 
and socialism is significant when it comes to the satisfaction of people’s self-respect. The 
satisfaction of self-respect is a major factor in the construction of the principles of justice. If 
economic systems can significantly affect the chances people have to satisfy their self-respect 
then the selection is a topic for a theory of justice; and accordingly, should be decided within the 
original position. Under the veil of ignorance people would choose socialism as the superior 
maximin solution, because it provides the most extensive protections for the worst off and should
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